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Sabotage

Well, I said I'd wait and see what the Dutch do.

Now, however, we know.

So, now we have a new count: ten EU members have approved the European Constituion by parliamentary votes (Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, Lithuania, Greece, Latvia). One, Spain, has done so by both referendum and action within the Cortes Generales.

On Sunday, French voters overwhelmingly rejected the EU Constitution, with over 54% saying "non" to all 300+ pages. Wednesday, the Dutch came out in force with an even more pronounced "nee" (nearly 62%). So, have France and the Netherlands, both founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community (think "proto-EU") in the early 1950s and traditional EU enthusiests EU supporters, put the brakes on the latest move towards European integration and EU streamlining?

Ah, there's the $64,000 question.

In the short term, yes. In the long term, probably no.

Of course, there were signs that rejection of the European Constitution was looming. Ironically, I'm sure big-wigs in Brussels, after the signing of the Constitution in Rome, feared rejection by some of the later referenda, particularly from the UK, Denmark, and Poland. After Spain's resounding "YES" back in February, the first signs of a possible French or Dutch "NO" began to pop up in earnest. How did it come to this? And, where does the EU go from here?

First off, it's important to realize, in all 25 EU members, the "NO" and "YES" camps were far from unified lobbying groups. Granted, the "NO" camps in France and the Netherlands both sought the same outcome, but, even within France's "NO" community, heterogeneity ruled. All-in-all, the Constitution rejections in France and the Netherlands don't send one, single message. They send an assortment. Just taking a glance at public comments of French or Dutch voters leaving the polling stations reveals a few of the alleged motivations behind a "NO" vote:
1. "I'm not in favor of the European Constituion" - Pretty obvious. In theory, any "NO" voter should be able to look me in the eye and say this. As the multitude of other explanations shows, however, the Constitution itself wasn't necessarily on everyone's mind.
2. "I'm dissatisfied with my government." - Chirac has a 39% approval rating, and Raffarin may go down in history as the least popular Prime Minister of the Fifth Republic... unless de Villepin does worse, that is. In the Netherlands, Queen Beatrix may be popular, but Balkenende’s center-right coalition hasn’t been doing so hot. For reasons I have yet to understand, most likely due to the fact that I was always raised to divide the issues between candidates and offices (a problem with Democrats on the national level, for example, won’t keep me necessarily from voting for a Democrat for a local or state office), large chunks of the European electorate still see any chance to go to the polls as an opportunity to voice their collective approval or disapproval of who’s-in-government. The fact that various opposition parties (especially in the Netherlands) were campaigning ferociously for a “YES” vote alongside those in government apparently didn’t turn any heads. Many French still read the referendum question Sunday as “Chirac: good Jacques, or bad Jacques?”
3. “I’ve always been against the European Union.” - Ultra-right nationalists freely testify to this. While in favor of the peace-through-unity, the (so far small) losses of national sovereignty have irked many groups committed to the independence of their respective countries.
4. “In theory, I support the Constitution and consolidation of the EU, but [insert problem with the Constitution or the EU itself]…” - With the possible exception of #2 above, I’m willing to bet this is the largest group of “NO” voters. Many folks on the street, particularly in Paris, The Hague, and Amsterdam, feel the EU itself is a worthy project to continue. But, small problems with various aspects of the EU system that have popped up in the past, in combination with reservations concerning the voluminous Constitution and possible ne’er-do-well “secrets” tucked away in its pages, have compounded to become huge problems for the “YES” camp, and a huge asset to the hardcore “NO” camp. These “problems” vary… they produce a similar result: anxiety about Europe’s future in a rapidly changing world.

Obviously, particularly with #4 above, both Brussels and the national governments have thus far failed to address these numerous issues to the public’s satisfaction. And these problems are not unique to the Netherlands and France. Thus, whether or not the Constitution is dead at this point, Brussels must take warning: deal with these issues, or ignore them at your own risk. The fact that the press has so many photographs of so many EU and national government officials looking stunned after the French vote, and downright pitiful after the Dutch vote (the image of Jean-Claude Juncker, Luxembourg’s PM and current president of the European Council, with tears in his eyes, for example), merely drives home the point that THE EU DIDN’T SEE THIS COMING. Sure, perhaps a few “pessimists” in Brussels and Strasbourg were expecting ratification “trouble” from Denmark (where the Treaty of Maastricht had to go through two referenda before passing), the U.K. (a “traditional Eurosceptic”), or newcomer Poland (still feeling like it and Spain lost out in the new European Parliament voting system), but I’ll bet the farm that cognitive dissonance set in among the “EU Elite,” and very few folks expected trouble from France, the EU’s third-largest nation and a founding member, or the Netherlands, another founding member and one of the EU’s most painstakingly loyal financial backers.

My gut tells me that Brussels tried to impose too much, too quickly on an increasingly unaware European audience. For the past several years, the gulf between EU institutions and the people they (in theory) represent has widened considerably, and the signs of the philosophical and political distances separating the “EU Elite” from the rest of Europe were there to see (if they’d wanted to see them, that is). Participation in European elections has been in a steady decline, culminating in a miserable turn-out for the most recent round of European Parliament elections… which some in Brussels had tried to brush of with, “Well, at least it’s not as low as turnout for American elections…” And, even with that low turn-out, Eurosceptic parties across the board made surprising gains. Anxiety over the EU’s most recent enlargement earlier this year, in which the project grew from fifteen to twenty-five nations, also fueled the Constitution’s “NO” vote. While France feared its waning influence in an EU of twenty-five, coupled especially with a stagnant economy, the Dutch continued to voice concerns of the opposite, that new, larger members like Poland and the Czech Republic would team up with other established members (Germany, France, the UK, Spain, Italy) and further dampen the cries of the EU’s smaller, yet no less significant members. With Italian, German, and French blatant violations of the Eurozone’s Stability and Growth Pact ignored, along with the Dutch government’s nearly masochistic attempts to abide by the Pact, it’s easy to see why the Dutch, and perhaps other small EU members, feel they’re being ignored by their big brothers and sisters.

Other enlargement arguments abound. Many assert that, after this huge addition of ten countries to an already strained and somewhat cumbersome EU, Europe needs precious time to… well… get used to its new self. Years, perhaps. I’m obviously pro-Constitution, but not right now. As the EU grew eastwards, voices in western Europe were urging restraint, allowing time for established EU citizens to become accustomed to a union of 484 million people. Talks of enlargement should have been curbed or, better yet, put to the voters first. I’m not advocating referenda each time a specific country wants to enter the EU, but Brussels failed to take the temperature of EU citizens regarding how much they’re willing to accept in such a short time frame. The EU went from fifteen to twenty-five overnight. Almost immediately afterwards, Romania and Bulgaria finalized accession procedures, and will join in 2007. Croatia opened (now stalled) negotiations. And, finally, Turkey, bulging with nearly 70 million predominantly Muslim citizens sitting (mostly) on the Asian continent, will begin accession talks this October. While it may not have seemed like a very large step to take in the halls of EU institutions in Bruseels, to Europeans in the streets of Paris and Amsterdam, the idea of an institution that once stretched no further east than Helsinki to embrace Ankara seemed like a large pill to swallow. Is it subtle racism that made the Dutch and French shake in their boots and yell “NO” (the anti-Turkey accession camp was widespread, vocal, and popular in both countries)? To me, not at all. I’ve more faith in humans. I still assert that anxiety stemming from the most recent enlargement, and fear about future enlargement, still boils down to economic woes. The EU cannot yet revive its overall economy. Sure, countries like Ireland are thriving, but Germany and France are facing massive unemployment, abysmal growth rates, and an increasingly grumbling electorate. Chirac’s UMP government became unpopular due largely to economic woes, and Germany’s ruling SDP/Green coalition just called for early elections after yet another statewide defeat, this time in North Rhine-Westphalia. The French, Dutch, and many other Europeans, instead of seeing “help” from their governments concerning their economies, hear rumors that further EU enlargements will lead to an export of jobs, and an influx of immigrants to compete for the few remaining positions. These are some of their fears. Will Brussels address them now, after such a resounding wake-up call?

Some commentators have also argued that the French and Dutch “NO” votes on the Constitution served merely to put the brakes on the direction they felt the EU was heading. Various “American-style” market reforms and curbs on EU government procedures were unpopular to both left-wing and right-wing parties, who saw long-term erosion of national identity and personal freedoms, in favor of unrestricted capitalism.

With all of the above arguments (and many more where those came from), who’s got it right? Why did the Dutch and French reject the European Constitution? I favor the Murder on the Orient Express approach: they all did it. Each tiny argument - economic and integration fears; right-wing anti-Turkey views; small-nation concerns; large-nation concerns; government dissatisfaction; the Constitution’s sheer length and painstakingly-negotiated language (which makes for one rather difficult-to-read document; the Constitution’s vague compromises in some areas, yet over-the-top details in others (do Maltese land transactions really deserve so many pages?) - each small criticism appealed to its own audience until, suddenly, the “NO” camp grew from a small band of “far-right crazies” to the empowered mainstream. And they sure turned out in force, as shown by the 69.3% French and 62.8% Dutch turnouts.

What now? Various EU and national leaders are calling for a continuation of the ratification process. I agree. At the very least, all twenty-five EU members should have to go on record one way or the other. And, when the dust settles, we’ll see where we stand. If, in the end, we’re left with twenty-three “YES” votes, and only France and the Netherlands saying “NO,” the Dutch and French governments may find themselves arm-twisted into second rounds of voting. EU-enthusiasts point to the second votes Denmark and Ireland had to have on the Treaties of Maastricht and Nice (respectively) as assertions that the Constitution is not yet dead. They also point to Spain, the only other nation so far to hold a referendum, which passed by 76.7%. But, like all European elections lately, turn-out was “American standard” low, at 42%. As shown by the high Dutch and French voter turn-outs, anti-Constitution sentiments run deeper than pro, as opponents came out in force to check non or nee. So, Spain did indeed say “YES,” but not enthusiastically, much to the embarrassment of the Zapatero government.

Here’s my prescription:
1. The Constitution, in its current form, is all but dead. But, let the voting continue. Let Europe have its say, showing each complaint and the reasoning behind it.
2. Let Bulgaria and Romania (assuming the latter gets its act together) join in 2007. It’s already agreed to. It’s only fair.
3. Slow down further enlargements. Talks with Croatia are already on hold until The Hague tribunal is satisfied. Talks with Turkey should go on, though current EU members must have their reassurances regarding economic recovery and immigration policies. Europeans must also be made to understand that Turkey is most likely decades away from joining. As for future would-be EUers, including Serbia and Montenegro, they should be given every opportunity to join, SLOWLY.
4. Present a new treaty for a Constitution, in a few years, at the earliest. This Constitution should be shorter in length and lighter in substance. Establish a Confederation, rather than a Federation.
5. Resist the urge to establish common policies for all in Brussels. The EU must realize that, for the time being, the European project works best on the scale it has currently established - with different policies implemented and experimented with in a single country, or groups of countries, and with national governments given substantial flexibility in implementation of EU policy, to fit their individual needs and cultural considerations. Obviously, agricultural policy for Malta will differ than that of Sweden. Austrian fishing regulations diverge from those of Ireland.

This week’s Economist paints a similar picture. The EU can continue to function very well with its established policies, and must come to appreciate the unity it can foster with a true appreciation of diversity. Perhaps, the Economist asserts, a new European motto should be “E unum pluribus” (out of one, many)… recognition that European identity IS its diverse cultural, ethnic, and religious heritage. By that token, the next Constitution should be deliberately flexible, reserving the “how to” for Nicosia, London, Madrid, Vienna, Luxembourg, Helsinki, and, eventually, Ankara, Zagreb, and beyond…

Posted by James at June 2, 2005 10:14 PM